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Abstract. Recent years have seen the world become a closely connected
society with the emergence of different types of social networks. Online
social networks have provided a way to bridge long distances and estab-
lish numerous communication channels which were not possible earlier.
These networks exhibit interesting behavior under intentional attacks
and random failures where different structural properties influence the
resilience in different ways.
In this paper, we perform two sets of experiments and draw conclusions
from the results pertaining to the resilience of social networks. The first
experiment performs a comparative analysis of four different classes of
networks namely small world networks, scale free networks, small world-
scale free networks and random networks with four semantically different
social networks under different attack strategies. The second experiment
compares the resilience of these semantically different social networks
under different attack strategies. Empirical analysis reveals interesting
behavior of different classes of networks with different attack strategies.
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1 Introduction
Online communication channels or mediums of computer mediated communi-
cation such as emails, blogs and online social networking websites represent
different forms of social networks. These networks have attracted billions of
users in recent years [2] adding new dimensions to socializing behavior and com-
munication technologies. These networks provide a challenging opportunity for
researchers from different domains to analyze and understand how the new age
of communication is shaping the future. These networks also help us understand
how information disseminates [14] in social networks and how communication
plays a role in the creation of new knowledge [20].
An important aspect of these networks is that they can undergo intentional
attacks or random failures which results in communication breakdown. Thus
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resilient or how robust these networks are against any malicious activity or
natural random failures [7,13]. Given a network with n nodes and m edges,
targeted or random attacks are modeled by the removal of a series of selected
nodes or edges from the network. The way these nodes or links are chosen,
known as the attack strategy determines the impact and behavoir it causes on
the resilience of the network.
The natural evolution of these networks has introduced several structural
properties which play an important role in determining the resilience of these
networks. These properties characterize the behvior of many social and other real
world networks giving us two important classifications, the scale free networks
[4] and small world networks [25]. Scale free networks have a degree distribu-
tion following power law4. Small world networks have low average path lengths
(APL) scaling logarithmically with the increase in number of nodes (n) and high
clustering coefficient implying the presence of large number of triads present in
the network. Many social networks have both these structural properties giving
us another class of networks called, small world-scale free networks.
Scale free networks have been extensively studied with respect to resilience,
and Internet provides the perfect dataset for such analysis [7,8,10]. Researchers
have shown that scale free networks are highly sensitive to targeted attacks
and very robust against random attack strategies [7,8]. This phenomena is often
termed as the ‘Achilles heel of the Internet’. Resilience of networks with only
small world properties, and both small world-scale free properties has not been
the focus of studies even though many social networks around us exhibit both
small world and scale free properties [21,18].
One example of such networks is the structure of the world wide web studied
by [5]. The authors found that the web has a bow tie structure and is very robust
against targeted attack on nodes. This result contradicts the findings that scale
free networks are fragile to targeted attacks. The reason is that deleting nodes
with high degree is not enough to cross the percolation threshold as the average
edge-node ratio (also called density or average degree) of these graphs is very
high. This finding is similar to our results for the case of social networks.
In this paper, we perform two sets of experiments. The first set of experi-
ments compares the behavior of four different classes of networks, small world
networks, scale free networks, small world-scale free networks and random net-
works with four equivalent size real social networks. These social networks are
from a political blog, Epinions who-trust-whom network, Twitter social network
and Co-authorship network of researchers. We study these networks under six
different attack strategies which are, targeted attack on nodes and edges, ran-
dom failure of nodes and edges, and almost random failure5 of nodes and edges
[10]. The idea is to see how structural organization of these different networks
impact resilience when their edge-node ratio is equivalent to that of semantically
different social networks. Our results lead us to these findings:
4 power law pk ∼ k−α where α is usually in the range of [2, 3]
5 defined in section 4
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– Five of the six attack strategies behave similarly for all different classes of
networks, the exception being targeted attack on nodes.
– Clustering coefficient has no effect on the resilience of networks if netoworks
with high edge-node ratio are studied.
– Results show scale free and small world-scale free networks are more fragile
to targeted attacks. Targeted attack on edges removes the same number of
edges from other classes of networks and the behavior of all classes including
random networks remains the same indicating that the different behavior
in scale free and small world-scale free networks is due to the large number
of edges being removed from the network and not due to the structural
organization of the network itself.
– Network generation models used to generate small world, scale free, and
small world-scale free networks differ largely from the behavior of real net-
works in terms of resilience suggesting structural flaws in existing network
generation models.
The second experiment studies the resilience of the four real social networks
in terms of different attack strategies on nodes, which was found to be more
interesting in the previous experiment. The results can be summarized below:
– We observe only minor differences between random and almost random fail-
ures for blog, epinions and twitter networks as compared to the author net-
work which demonstrates some differences between the two strategies.
– Attack on Targeted nodes clearly differs from random and almost random
failures whereas the author network seems to be the most fragile. The blog,
epinions and twitter network demonstrate graceful degradation in perfor-
mance in terms of size of biggest component.
Rest of the paper is structured as follows: In the next section we discuss
several studies pertaining to resilience of different types of networks. Section 3
provides the details of the real world datasets and the networks generated using
different network generation models. In section 4, we describe our experimental
set up and the metrics used for analysis. Section 5 explains the results obtained
and provide findings from the experimentation and finally we conclude in section
6 also giving future research directions.
2 Related Work
One of the earliest studies to demonstrate that scale free networks are more
robust against random failures was conducted by [3]. The authors also discuss
the vulnerability of scale free networks to targeted attacks. Cohen et al. [7,8]
study the resilience of internet under random and targeted attacks on nodes.
For the case of random attacks, they conclude that even after 100% removal
of nodes, the connectivity of the biggest component remains intact that spans
the whole of the network. The authors claim that this condition will remain
true for other networks if their connectivity distribution follows power law with
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power law coefficient less than 3. For the case of targeted attacks, scale free
networks are highly sensitive to targeted attacks on nodes as the biggest con-
nected component disintegrates much sooner. Holme et al. [13] study attacks on
edges using betweenness centrality where edges with the highest centrality are
removed. They show that recalculating betweenness centrality after each dele-
tion is a more effective attack strategy for complex networks. Paul et al. [19]
discuss that networks with a given degree distribution may be very resilient to
one type of failure or attack but not to another. They determine network design
strategies to maximize the robustness of networks to both intentional attacks and
random failures keeping the cost of the network constant where cost is measured
in terms of network connections. Analytical solutions for site percolation on ran-
dom graphs with general degree distributions were studied by [6] for a variety
of cases such as site and bond percolation. Serrano et al. [22] introduce a frame-
work to analyze percolation properties of random clustered networks and small
world-scale free networks. They find that the high number of triads can affect
some properties such as the size and resilience of biggest connected component.
Wang et al. [24] studied the robustness of scale free networks to random failures
from the perspective of network heterogeneity. They examine the relationship of
entropy of the degree distribution, minimal connectivity and scaling component
obtaining optimal design for scale free networks against random failure. Estrada
[9] studied sparse complex networks having high connectivity known as good ex-
pansion. Using a graph spectral method, the author introduces a new parameter
to measure the good expansion and classify 51 real-world complex networks into
four groups with different resilience against targeted node attacks. Wang and
Rong[23] analyse the response of scale free networks to different types of attacks
on edges during cascading propagation. They used the scale free model [4] and
reported that scale free networks are more fragile to attacks on the edges with
the lowest loads than the ones with the highest loads. Liu et al. also affirm that
scale free networks are highly resilient to random failures. The authors suggest
network design guidelines which maximize the network robustness to random
and targeted attacks. A comprehensive study conducted by Magnien et al.[16]
survey the impact of failures and attacks on Poisson and power law random
networks considering the main results of the field acquired. The authors also list
new findings which are stated as under:
– Focusing on the random failure of nodes and edges, although previous re-
searchers had predicted completely different behavior for Poisson and power
law networks, in practice the differences, are vital but not huge. Our results
re-enforce these results specially for the case of social networks.
– The authors also invalidate the explanation that targeted attacks are very
efficient on power-law networks because they remove many links, random
removal of as many links also result in breakdown of the network.
– Networks with Poisson degree distribution behave similarly in case of random
node failures and targeted attacks, it must be noted that their threshold is
significantly lower in the second case. This goes against the often claimed
assumption that, because all nodes have almost the same degree in a Poisson
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network, there is little difference between random node failures and targeted
attacks.
Resilience has not been extensively studied for social networks. Moreover,
studies focus on networks that are either only scale free or their sizes are not
comparable to online social networks readily available around us. Considering the
new findings that deviate with the previous results, we get a strong motivation
to further investigate resilience of different types of complex networks with a
focus on social networks. Our empirical results reaffirm most of these findings of
[16] where our focus is on semantically different social networks.
3 Data Sets
We have used four semantically different real world networks which represent
social communication of different forms. These are the Political Blog network,
Twitter, Epinions and Author network which we are abbreviated as (RN) and
are described below.
Political Blog network is a network of hyperlinks between weblogs on US
politics, recorded in 2005 by Adamic and Glance[1]. Twitter network is one of
the most popular online social networks for communication among online users
and we have used the dataset extracted by [11]. Epinions network is a who-
trust-whom online network of a customer analysis website Epinions and the
data is downloaded from the stanford website (http://snap.stanford.edu/
data/) where it is publicly available. The Author network is a co-authorship
network where two authors are linked with an edge, if they co-authored a com-
mon work(an article, book etc). The dataset is made available by Vladimir
Batagelj and Andrej Mrvar: Pajek datasets (http://vlado.fmf.uni-lj.si/
pub/networks/data/). For all these networks, we only consider the biggest con-
nected component and treat these networks as simple and undirected. Table 1
shows the number of nodes and edges in these networks along with the edge-node
ratio. For each of these real networks, we generated equivalent size networks us-
ing four network generation models referred above. The introduction of real data
not only allowed us to select realistic edge-node ratio, but also to compare these
models with real data.
We have also used four network generation models to represent different
types of networks. The small world (SW) model of Watts and Strogatz[25], the
scale free (SF) model of Barabasi and Albert[4], the Small world-Scale free (HK)
model of Holme and Kim[12] and, the Erdo¨s (RD) model for Random graphs.
The small world model can be tuned to the desired number of nodes and edges
by initializing a regular graph where each node has a degree of n. The scale free
model can be tuned by the number of edges each new node has in the network
where all nodes connect preferentially. Similarly the model for small world-scale
free networks can be tuned by the number of nodes each new node connects to,
giving us a network with the desired edge-node ratio approximately. A random
network is generated using n nodes and m edges where the degree distribution
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pk of the network follows a Poisson distribution pk = e
−λ λk
k! . The networks we
generated all had λ > 1 which signifies that most nodes in the network have a
degree close to the mean degree of the network.
Network Nodes Edges Edge-Node Ratio
Blog 1222 16714 13.6
Twitter 2492 17658 7.0
Epinions 2000 48720 24.3
Author 3621 9461 2.6
Table 1. Network Statistics for different social networks
For the purpose of experimentation and empirical analysis, we generated 5
artificial networks each for small world, scale free, small world-scale free and
random networks equivalent to the 4 different social networks giving us a total
of 80 networks. We averaged the readings obtained for these networks although
the networks had very little variations with standard deviations of less than 1
in all the cases. Table 2 shows the degree of most connected nodes, clustering
coefficients and average path lengths for the generated networks in comparison
to real networks.
A clear similarity among all these networks is the low average path length
which indicates that on average, nodes in all these networks lie close to each
other following the famous ‘six degrees of separation’ rule. All the real networks
are both small world and scale free in nature, the scale free networks have a low
clustering coefficient and the degree distribution of small world networks and
random networks follow a Poisson distribution with λ > 1.
4 Experimentation
As described above, we studied resilience considering six attack strategies, three
of which are for nodes and three for edges. These are Targeted attack on Nodes,
Random failure of Nodes, Almost Random failure of Nodes, Targeted attack on
Edges, Random failure of Edges and Almost Random failure of Edges. Each of
these strategies is described below:
Targeted attacks on nodes and edges: The attack strategy for targeted
removal of nodes removes nodes in decreasing order of their degree (connectivity).
This strategy is used by many other researchers[10] for such studies.
To determine targeted edges, we propose a slightly different version from the
one used by [10]. The authors removed edges connected to high degree nodes
which suits well for networks like scale free networks. Our method is inspired
by the concept of funneling in social networks [17] where most connections of a
person to other people are usually through a small set of people and connections
with one or two famous personalities reduces the distance from all other people in
the social network. Thus important edges linking many people would be the ones
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Data Set Real Network RD SW SF HK
Highest Degree of a Node
Blog 351 46 47 211 321
Twitter 237 27 27 253 319
Epinions 1192 77 72 373 560
Author 102 15 16 201 183
Clustering Coefficient
Blog 0.32 0.02 0.56 0.07 0.24
Twitter 0.13 0.005 0.49 0.03 0.27
Epinions 0.27 0.02 0.58 0.08 0.22
Author 0.53 0.001 0.31 0.01 0.42
Average Path Length
Blog 2.7 2.5 3.2 2.4 2.2
Twitter 3.4 3.2 4.2 2.9 2.8
Epinions 2.2 2.2 3.0 2.2 2.0
Author 5.31 5.07 6.41 3.4 4.0
Table 2. Rd=Random Network, Sw=Small World, Sf=Scale Free, Hk=Holme and Kim
Model for small world-scale free networks. Table shows different metrics calculated for
the real and artificially generated networks for comparison.
between high degree people. We assign a weight W (ei,j) to all m edges where
i, j represents the edge between nodes i and j based on the degree of each node
using the equation: W (ei,j) = deg(i) + deg(j). Nodes are removed in decreasing
order of W in an attempt to remove edges that connect most connected people
in the network.
Random failure of nodes and edges: Random removal of nodes and edges
is modeled by a series of failures of nodes or edges selected randomly from the
network with equal probability.
Almost random failure of nodes and edges: These attack strategies were
described by [10] as more efficient attack strategies in case of scale free networks.
Almost random failure of nodes removes randomly selected nodes with degree
atleast 2 and almost random failure of edges removes edges between vertices
where the degree of each vertex is atleast 2.
Quantifying Resilience of a network: In order to quantify the resilience
of a network, we use the two most commonly applied methods, one measures the
number of nodes and the other measures the average path length of the biggest
connected component in the network after each attack . The percentage of nodes
still connected after an attack provides an estimation of how resilient networks
are. Similarly the increase in the average distance from any one node to the other
also provides an estimation of how resilient the networks are after each attack.
We have studied the effects after every 10% removal of either nodes or edges
against the percentage of nodes remaining in the biggest connected component
and the average path length of this component.
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5 Results and Discussion
Fig. 1. RN=Blog, HK=Small world-scale free, RD=Random, SF=Scale free,
SW=Small world. X-axis: % of nodes (a,c,e) and edges (b,d,f) removed from the
network,Y-axis: % of nodes (left) and APL (right) of the biggest connected compo-
nent.
Figures (1, 2, 3 and 4) show the results for all the four datasets with different
attack strategies on nodes and edges. The first findings are for the cases where
we studied targeted attack on edges, random attacks on nodes, random attacks
on edges, almost random attack on nodes and almost random attack on edges.
For all the these networks, we find that the real networks behave similarly to
all 4 classes of networks, small world, scale free, small world-scale free and ran-
dom networks if the same fraction of nodes or edges are removed as shown in
figures. We justify these results based on the idea that increasing the minimum
mean connectivity of nodes increases the robustness of networks to targeted and
random attacks also discussed by [15]. For all the social networks under consid-
eration, they have very high average connectivity as shown in Table 1. Even for
the case of author network which has an average connectivity of 2.6, it is still
high as compared to internet networks previously studied in the literature.
Another generic finding is with respect to the clustering coefficients of dif-
ferent networks. Although there are extreme differences in random and social
networks, having low values of even 0.001 and high values of around 0.5 (see
Table 2) respectively. Still the behavior in terms of resilience remains the same
for all these networks. This indicates that the presence or absence of triads does
not reflect on the robustness of a network.
The analysis of scale free and small world-scale free networks which are fragile
to targeted attacks when compared to small world and random networks is also
very interesting. This result is the direct implication of the large number of edges
removed from scale free and small world-scale free networks as a result of targeted
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Fig. 2. RN=Epinions, HK=Small world-scale free, RD=Random, SF=Scale free,
SW=Small world. X-axis: % of nodes (a,c,e) and edges (b,d,f) removed from the net-
work, Y-axis: % of nodes (left) and APL (right) of the biggest connected component.
Fig. 3. RN=Author, HK=Small world-scale free, RD=Random, SF=Scale free,
SW=Small world. X-axis: % of nodes (a,c,e) and edges (b,d,f) removed from the net-
work, Y-axis: % of nodes (left) and APL (right) of the biggest connected component.
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Fig. 4. RN=Twitter, HK=Small world-scale free, RD=Random, SF=Scale free,
SW=Small world. X-axis: % of nodes (a,c,e) and edges (b,d,f) removed from the net-
work, Y-axis: % of nodes (left) and APL (right) of the biggest connected component.
attack on high degree nodes. Since nodes with very high degree are absent from
small world and random networks, the same fraction of edges is not removed
upon removal of high degree nodes and they give an impression that they are
more resilient to targeted attack on nodes. The experiment on targeted attack
on edges provides a contradiction to this result as equal number of edges are
removed from real networks, scale free, small world, small world-scale free and
random networks and the results show that the behavior of all these networks is
almost the same. This claim is further justified from our results of random attack
on edges as, again, they reveal similar behvior for all these classes of networks
both in terms of size of biggest connected component and APL.
Another important result is the behavior of network generation models against
the real networks for targeted attack on nodes. All the real world networks dis-
integrate more quickly than the artificially generated networks for all the four
data sets used for experimentation. This observation highlights the fact that net-
work generation models fail to accurately capture all the structural properties
of real world networks. This is due to the structural organization of real social
networks as compared to the artificially generated networks. In real networks,
there is a high percentage of low degree nodes that are connected through high
degree nodes only, when these high degree nodes are removed in case of targeted
attacks, they immediately become disconnected. On the other hand, artificially
generated networks are all based on random connectivity among nodes, and they
are not necassarily connected only through high degree nodes, which makes them
more resilient when high degree nodes are removed from the network.
We discuss the results for each set of first experiment below:
Targeted attacks on Nodes: As a general trend, both random and small
world networks behave almost similarly for all the datasets. Further more, they
are more resilient than small world-scale free (HK) networks and scale free net-
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works (SF). Another important discovery is the behavior of all the real data sets
in comparison to the artificially generated networks. Real datasets disintegrate
faster than any other model as shown in figures 1(left), 2(left), 3(left) and 4(left)
for the case of targeted attacks. The least resilient network is the Author network
which disintegrates after 10% highest degree nodes are removed. For the case of
Blog and Twitter network, around 40% removal of high degree nodes is sufficient
to break the entire network as the size of the biggest component falls below 10%,
whereas epinions network falls below 10% after around 50% removal of nodes
making it more resilient to targeted attacks. Again the edge-node ratio plays an
important role as clearly epinions network has the highest value of 24.3. This,
when compared with the Author network with edge-node ration of 2.6 indicates
how having more edges nullifies the effects of targeted attacks on networks. The
above similarity in the behavoir of networks is further reinforced after looking
the behavoir of APL in figures 1(right), 2(right), 3(right) and 4(right) where
variations can only be observed in the case of targetted attack on nodes.
Random failure of Nodes: The behavior of random removal of nodes for
all the six cases reveals an interesting similarity specially for the case of generated
scale free network, small world network, random network and the real data sets.
Particularly for the Blog and Epinions data, almost 100% similar behavoir is
evident from figure 1(left) and figure 2(left). Twitter and Author networks also
show high similarity as shown in figures 3(left) and 4(left). A linear decay is
observed in the number of nodes present in the biggest component against linear
removal of nodes which suggests that the nodes remain connected even after 90%
of the nodes are removed which demonstrates very high resilience for all these
networks againt random node failures. The APL of small world networks for all
data sets has a slightly higher value indicating minor difference in the empirical
values, but the overall behavior and decay pattern is the same for all networks.
Almost Random failure of Nodes: Just as random failures, almost ran-
dom failure of nodes demonstrates a high similarity among the different classes
of networks and the real networks. Differences can be observed only for the case
of author network which has a much lower edge-node ratio. The behavior of the
real author network deviates slightly from the other classes of networks. This is
contradictory to the results of [10] where they showed that this strategy is more
efficient than random failures. The networks used to show these results by [10]
had an edge-node ratio of less than 3 and where the networks we use here have
a much higher edge-node ratio with the exception of the author network, which
has an edge-node ratio of 2.6 and thus we can see differences in the results of
random failures and almost random failures in the author network.
Targeted attacks on Edges: All the networks show an equivalent resilience
against targeted attack on edges when compared to random removal of edges.
The author network in Figure 3(left) again shows an early breakdown of the
biggest component further proving our claim of high mean connectivity being
an important reason for resilient structures.
Random failure of Edges: A slight variation in the resilience can be ob-
served for all the networks. All real networks show a tendency to disintegrate
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more than the generated networks specially after the removal of 60% edges.
Author network is the least resilient case where all the generated and the real
networks disintegrate into smaller components after a removal of around 60%
edges. Since the author network has the least edge-node ratio (see Table 2), this
behavior further proves that other networks show a resilient behavior because of
high mean connectivity of the nodes.
Almost Random failure of Edges: All the dataset behave exactly the
same except for the case of epinions network where after the removal of 60%
edges result in different pattern. The small world and the random network behave
similarly as they are least resilient. The scale free and small world-scale free
networks behave similarly being more resilient and epinions network is in between
these two behaviors.
The second experiment compares different attack strategies on nodes using
four real networks as shown in figure 5. The previous experiment revealed that
targeted attack on nodes is the most efficient attack strategy in terms of different
classes of networks. The second experiment compares different attack strategies
on nodes for different social networks.
The first findings from this experiment are that there are only minor differ-
ences in random attacks and almost random attacks when the edge node ratio of
the networks is high. Slight differences can be observed for the author network
in figure 5(b) which has comparatively low edge-node ratio. This is in contradic-
tion to the results of [10], who studied internet graphs with much less edge-node
ratio. Internet graphs are known to have star-like structures where a single node
sits (known as hub) in between many other nodes providing efficient connectiv-
ity among many nodes. Removing nodes with degree 2 or more unintentionally
targets these hubs which in turn results in breakdown of the network. In con-
trast to this, social networks do not have hubs. Removing nodes with degree 2
or more does not break the network specially for networks with high edge-node
ratio because there are many paths that connect a single node, thus making it
more resilient to this type of attack.
The second finding is as expected, the effectiveness of targeted attack on
nodes as compared to random and almost random failures. The author networks
has a low percolation threshold and the network breaks immediately into rela-
tively larger size connected components. The Blog, Epinions and Twitter network
demonstrate a more graceful degradations with a high percolation threshold as
most of the nodes remain connected into a single connected component even
after the removal of 40% to 60% high degree nodes.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied the behavior of small world, scale free and small
world-scale free networks in comparison to random and four semantically differ-
ent social networks. Our results show that that behavior of all these classes of
networks remains the same under targeted attack on edges, random attack on
nodes and edges, almost random attack on nodes and edges both in terms of
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Fig. 5. Comparative analysis of different attack strategies on nodes for the 4 semanti-
cally different social networks.
size of biggest component and average path length. The behavior of these net-
works change under targeted attack on nodes. Interesting behavoir was observed
on the basis of clustering coefficient and targeted attack on edges. Furthermore
structural differences were observed between real social networks and all net-
work generation models. Insignificant differences were observed between random
failure of nodes and edges when compared with almost random failures.
We intend to extend this study by incorporating large size social networks.
The networks studied are unweighted and undirected, and we intend to analyze
the behavior of these networks as well. Another important characteristic of social
networks is the temporal dimension which plays an important role in dictating
many social processes such as information diffusion and epidemics and we would
also like to study resilience for temporal social networks.
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